Small Island Developing States and the Global AI Governance Table: How Caribbean Nations Can Claim Their Seat

By March 2026, global AI governance has a recognisable shape. The EU AI Act's high-risk AI obligations are approaching their August 2026 deadline, and Caribbean governments and businesses caught by its extraterritorial reach are still working through where they stand. Caribbean governments are engaging more with digital economy frameworks, and the EU AI Act's general-purpose AI code of practice has been in development since late 2025. International AI governance is not settled, but it now has a structure and a set of leading voices.

Those leading voices are not Caribbean. They are American, European, and increasingly Chinese and Indian. The Bletchley Declaration of November 2023, the Seoul AI Safety Summit of May 2024, the G7 Hiroshima AI Process, the OECD AI Principles, and the UN General Assembly's first AI resolution of March 2024: all of these formative moments in international AI governance occurred with minimal Caribbean SIDS participation. The frameworks that emerged from those moments will shape how AI is developed, deployed, regulated, and held accountable for decades.

My hypothesis is unambiguous: Caribbean SIDS must move from passive observers to active shapers of global AI governance frameworks, and achieving this requires a deliberate strategic shift in how Caribbean governments and regional institutions approach international engagement on AI. This is not an argument for Caribbean exceptionalism. It is an argument for Caribbean presence: at the tables where standards are set, at the forums where norms are negotiated, and in the institutions where implementation is designed.

What follows is why Caribbean SIDS have been marginalised in global AI governance, what interests the Caribbean needs to defend in international forums, and what a Caribbean strategy for that engagement looks like in practice.

The Marginalisation Pattern and Why It Is Not Inevitable

Caribbean SIDS' marginalisation in global AI governance is not primarily the result of deliberate exclusion. It reflects a pattern that recurs across global governance domains: technical forums begin as discussions among leading technology-producing nations, develop momentum and produce initial frameworks that reflect those nations' priorities, and by the time developing countries are formally included, the essential architecture is already fixed. The marginalised nations are then offered the choice between accepting those frameworks or being outside them.

The Caribbean has faced this pattern in financial regulation, with the FATF's anti-money laundering framework. It has faced it in trade, with WTO agreements developed primarily by large economies. It has faced it in climate, where Caribbean SIDS were not at the table during the early formulation of the UNFCCC framework but have since, through the Alliance of Small Island States, become effective and recognised advocates for SIDS-specific concerns including the 1.5 degree Celsius temperature goal and loss and damage financing.

The climate comparison is instructive, and I return to it throughout this article, because it shows that late-entry advocacy can change outcomes when it is strategic, coordinated, and technically grounded. Caribbean nations' contributions to climate governance are out of all proportion to their size. There is no structural reason the same cannot be true of AI governance.

The difference between climate and AI is that the global AI governance architecture is less mature and less institutionally settled than the climate framework was by the time AOSIS became an effective force. The window for shaping AI governance fundamentals is still, just, open. The question is whether Caribbean governments will choose to use it.

What Caribbean SIDS Actually Have at Stake

The case for Caribbean engagement in global AI governance is not abstract. There are concrete interests at stake that current international frameworks do not adequately protect.

The first is data sovereignty. Caribbean citizens' data is being processed by AI systems operated by companies headquartered in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere. The terms on which that processing occurs, the rights Caribbean citizens have to challenge AI-driven decisions made about them by foreign companies, and the liability regime that applies when those systems cause harm are all determined by frameworks in which Caribbean governments have had minimal input. Data sovereignty for SIDS requires representation in the forums where data governance standards are set.

The second is climate-relevant AI. Caribbean SIDS are among the most climate-vulnerable territories on earth. AI systems for early warning, agricultural adaptation, fisheries management, and disaster response are not peripheral applications; they may decide whether warnings reach people in time. The standards that govern how those AI systems are designed, tested, and held accountable need to reflect the specific requirements of small island climates and ecosystems. No international framework currently addresses this with adequate specificity, and that gap will only be filled if Caribbean governments argue for it.

The third is the economic dimension. Anguilla's .ai domain economy generated approximately US$39 million in 2024. The Caribbean's business process outsourcing sector, which serves North American and European clients, is increasingly AI-enabled. Tourism operators are adopting AI tools for demand forecasting, pricing, and customer engagement. Financial services in Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, and Jamaica are AI-intensive. These activities depend on the international AI governance environment, and the people running them deserve representation as that environment takes shape.

The fourth is the proportion of Caribbean AI adoption. At approximately 14 per cent, compared to 24 per cent in the Global North, the Caribbean's AI adoption rate reflects a technology access gap that global AI governance frameworks should address through measures on affordable access, capacity-building support, and non-discriminatory technology transfer. These measures will not appear in international frameworks unless Caribbean governments argue for them.

The UN System: Where Caribbean Voice Carries Most Weight

The UN system is structurally favourable to small states. One nation, one vote in the General Assembly. Universal membership. Formal processes for developing country participation. And a history of successful SIDS advocacy, from the Barbados Programme of Action (1994) to the SAMOA Pathway (2014) to the Bridgetown Initiative (2022) on multilateral development finance reform.

The UN General Assembly's first AI resolution, passed on 21 March 2024, demonstrates that the UN system can produce AI governance outcomes. The resolution endorsed principles for safe, secure, and trustworthy AI that include developing country concerns about the digital divide and equitable access to AI's benefits. The UN High-level Advisory Body on AI, whose final report, "Governing AI for Humanity," was published in September 2024, recommended the establishment of an international AI governance body within the UN system, with universal membership and attention to developing country needs.

Caribbean governments should be active supporters and shapers of whatever UN AI governance body emerges from these processes. The precedent of AOSIS in climate negotiations is directly applicable: a coalition of small island states that coordinates carefully, develops technically credible positions, and maintains consistent presence at negotiating sessions can have influence far exceeding what individual small nation delegations could achieve. I am arguing that CARICOM should seek to build an AI governance advocacy coalition with AOSIS members across the Pacific and Indian Oceans, creating a global SIDS AI governance coalition that no major power can ignore.

Engaging with the EU AI Act's International Dimensions

The EU AI Act contains provisions on international cooperation and is, through the EU AI Office, developing external engagement strategies. The Act's August 2026 deadline for high-risk AI obligations is approaching, creating both compliance pressures and diplomatic opportunities for Caribbean governments.

The compliance pressure is real. Caribbean technology companies that export AI services to Europe, Caribbean financial institutions that use AI systems supplied by EU-regulated vendors, and Caribbean tourism operators that use AI tools subject to EU market rules all need to know where they stand. The EU AI Office is the point of contact for that, and Caribbean governments that have opened formal dialogue with the Office can help their private sectors through it far better than those that have not.

The diplomatic opportunity is equally real. The EU is seeking international partners for AI governance cooperation. The EU-CARICOM relationship, grounded in the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group's historical partnership with the EU and the successor OACPS-EU Partnership Agreement, provides a diplomatic channel through which AI governance cooperation can be formalised. A structured EU-CARICOM AI cooperation agreement, providing for technical assistance, information-sharing on AI incidents, and Caribbean participation in EU AI standards development, would be a real achievement that serves both parties' interests.

Jamaica's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, in coordination with Jamaica's Ministry of Science, Energy and Technology, should lead the effort to initiate this dialogue. Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados, with their large EU-facing economic relationships, should be co-advocates. The case to make to EU counterparts is straightforward: effective global AI governance requires developing country participation, and CARICOM is a willing, capable, and geographically strategic partner.

Building Caribbean Technical Capacity for International Engagement

Effective international AI governance engagement requires technical credibility. A delegation that can only make general statements about developing country concerns will have less influence than one that can present technically precise proposals backed by evidence. Building that capacity is therefore a strategic priority, not just a development aspiration.

The University of the West Indies is the natural institutional home for Caribbean AI governance research and policy capacity. Its campuses in Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, and across the OECS create a regional research infrastructure that could, with appropriate investment, generate the evidence base that Caribbean governments need to support credible international advocacy. A dedicated UWI Centre for AI Governance and Policy would serve this function, producing analysis of how international AI governance standards affect Caribbean SIDS, developing Caribbean-specific AI governance tools and frameworks, and training Caribbean government officials in AI governance.

The Caribbean is also not without individual specialists. The diaspora includes AI researchers, digital policy experts, and legal specialists working in international organisations, universities, and technology companies in North America and Europe. A deliberate strategy to engage this diaspora in Caribbean AI governance, through advisory roles, secondments to government agencies, and participation in CARICOM AI governance bodies, would bring international expertise into Caribbean policy development without requiring those specialists to permanently relocate.

Anguilla's .ai domain revenue is, in this context, worth noting as a potential funding mechanism. A small percentage of .ai domain revenue, directed to a Caribbean AI Governance Capacity Fund, would generate a recurring, independent source of financing for Caribbean participation in international AI governance processes. This is not fanciful; it is the kind of creative financing mechanism that Caribbean SIDS have used in other domains.

The AOSIS Model: Coalition Building for SIDS

The Alliance of Small Island States, established in 1990, transformed Caribbean climate governance advocacy from isolated national positions into a coordinated small island bloc that changed the architecture of the global climate regime. AOSIS was the force that put the 1.5 degree Celsius target on the agenda of the Paris Agreement negotiations. It was the coalition that secured dedicated loss and damage discussions at COP27. Its effectiveness comes from the combination of clear collective interests, disciplined coordination, and consistent technical engagement over decades.

I am advocating for the creation of an equivalent structure for AI governance: a Small Island Developing States AI Coalition that brings together Caribbean SIDS, Pacific SIDS, Indian Ocean SIDS, and the small states of the Atlantic and Mediterranean under a single advocacy framework. The coalition's initial priority would be to ensure that the emerging UN AI governance architecture includes formal SIDS representation, dedicated SIDS capacity-building mechanisms, and provisions addressing the specific AI governance concerns of climate-vulnerable small island economies.

This coalition does not need to be a new institution from scratch. It can be built on the existing AOSIS structure by adding an AI governance working group. It can be coordinated through the Commonwealth Secretariat, which serves many of the relevant SIDS. The CARICOM Secretariat should take the initiative in proposing this coalition and should volunteer to host its initial working group, thereby establishing Caribbean leadership in SIDS AI governance advocacy from the outset.

Recommendations

1. Establish a CARICOM AI Ambassador with a mandate to represent the region in international AI governance forums. The Ambassador should be a senior official or eminent person with technical credibility in AI policy, mandated by CARICOM Heads of Government, and supported by a small secretariat within the CARICOM Secretariat. The Ambassador's first year of work should focus on: formalising Caribbean participation in UN AI governance processes; initiating dialogue with the EU AI Office; and proposing the creation of the SIDS AI Coalition at the next AOSIS meeting.
2. Propose a SIDS AI Governance Working Group within AOSIS at the next scheduled AOSIS meeting. CARICOM should bring a formal proposal to establish this working group with a defined mandate: to develop a common SIDS position on international AI governance, to coordinate SIDS participation in UN and other international AI forums, and to advocate for SIDS-specific provisions in international AI governance instruments including the proposed UN AI governance body.
3. Initiate a formal EU-CARICOM AI Cooperation Dialogue through the OACPS-EU Partnership Agreement channel. The dialogue should seek: structured consultation on the EU AI Act's implications for Caribbean SIDS; technical assistance for Caribbean AI governance capacity-building; Caribbean participation in EU AI standards development processes; and information-sharing arrangements on high-risk AI incidents affecting both parties. Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago should co-lead the initiation of this dialogue.
4. Establish a UWI Centre for AI Governance and Policy with regional mandate and international connectivity. The Centre should be funded through a combination of CARICOM member state contributions, international development assistance, and revenue from the .ai domain economy. Its research programme should focus on: the impacts of international AI governance frameworks on Caribbean SIDS; Caribbean AI bias and human rights risk analysis; AI governance capacity-building for Caribbean government officials; and Caribbean contributions to international AI ethics and standards processes.
5. Develop a Caribbean SIDS AI Governance Position Paper for submission to the UN AI governance process by the end of 2026. The position paper should articulate CARICOM's specific interests and advocacy priorities in international AI governance, drawing on the technical work of the CARICOM AI Governance Council and the UWI Centre. It should be formally submitted to the relevant UN body and circulated to all major international AI governance forums. A position paper, clearly branded as representing Caribbean SIDS collectively, creates a reference document that international partners can engage with and that establishes Caribbean presence in the documentary record of AI governance development.
6. Table a SIDS AI capacity-building fund proposal at the next G20 and OECD AI Policy Observatory engagement. The fund should provide financing for SIDS participation in international AI governance forums, SIDS government AI policy capacity-building, and SIDS AI research. It should be modelled on existing climate finance mechanisms for SIDS and should be proposed collectively by the SIDS AI Coalition. CARICOM member states that have G20 observer status or OECD relationships, including through the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, should use those channels to advance the proposal.

The Seat Is Still Empty

The global AI governance table has been set, and the first decisions have already been taken: the Bletchley Declaration, the OECD AI Principles, the EU AI Act, the UN General Assembly resolution, the Seoul Safety Summit. Caribbean SIDS watched all of it from outside the room. The question for 2026 and beyond is whether Caribbean governments take their seats for what comes next: the design of the UN AI governance body, the implementation of the EU AI Act's international provisions, and the second generation of international standards that will build on the foundations already laid.

The AOSIS model shows that late-entry SIDS advocacy can rewrite outcomes when it is strategic and sustained. The Caribbean has the intellectual capacity, the regional institutional infrastructure, and the concrete interests necessary to build an effective international AI governance advocacy programme. What it lacks is the political decision to treat this as a priority comparable to climate diplomacy and trade advocacy.

The work is specific. Appoint the CARICOM AI Ambassador, propose the SIDS AI Coalition through AOSIS, open the EU-CARICOM dialogue, fund the UWI Centre, and submit a Caribbean position paper to the UN process by the end of the year. These are the moves that turn observer status into real influence. The rules that govern the Caribbean's AI future will be written by whoever shows up to write them, and right now the region's chair at that table is empty.

About the Author

Adrian Dunkley is a Caribbean AI governance expert with extensive experience in legal and regulatory framework analysis, legislative gap analysis, and policy reform recommendations in AI governance, digital technologies, data protection, and human rights law. He advises Caribbean government institutions and regional bodies on AI policy and has worked across Jamaica and the wider CARICOM region on digital economy development. Adrian is a co-founder of StarApple AI, the Caribbean's first AI company, and founder of AI Jamaica. He presents regularly at regional and international forums on AI governance, digital rights, and Caribbean development strategy. Contact: insights@starapple.ai